| Abstract: |
Discusses G. H. Mead's (e.g., 1934) conception of consciousness, focusing on
his 2 main concepts of consciousness. The 2nd of Mead's concepts refers to
phenomena that arise in human conduct from a context provided by the 1st
type of consciousness--the "consciousness qua experience." Mead suggested
that experience is what it is concretely, and people may respond to experience
or treat it in different ways depending on their purposes, which alter
subsequent experience. The fact that the reality of a part of experience is
brought into question does not make the doubted part any less objective or
environmental or any more private or internal, particularly when what is
experienced is shared by others. The 2nd concept, "consciousness qua
awareness," is described as a concept that develops out of social interaction
within a world that is already there in experience and is determined in its
immediate continuation by the behavior that occurs. Consciousness qua
awareness is discussed in terms of the individual as a social object, whether
only selves are aware, awareness as self-address, and the generalized other as
audience. (24 ref) ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |