| Abstract: |
Noting that any set of perceptually applied concepts could apply equally to
different things or to identical things at different times, the present author
questions how identical perceptions, once they are applied to different things,
can be distinguished from one another. Possible ways in which identical
perceptions can be differentiated are discussed, including the criteria of
reflective perception, naive realistic perception, and causality. The present
author also considers J. R. Searles's (1983) proposal that the intentional
content of perception has a causal, self-referential character, which
distinguishes it from any other perception. It is shown how Searles's proposal
of intentional content fails to offer a full solution to the initial question of how
to tell seemingly identical perceptions apart. The present author concludes that
concrete perceptual reference depends on the special ways in which perceptual
experience is realized in consciousness and in phenomenal properties. It is this
qualitative realization of experience that shows what causes the perception and
illustrates the experience of it, independent of any other perception. (32 ref)
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