Author: Natsoulas, Thomas
Affiliation: U California, Dept of Psychology, Davis, CA, USA
Title: The case of intrinsic theory: II. An examination of a conception of consciousness-sub-4 as intrinsic, necessary, and concomitant.
Source: Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1996 Fal, 1996. 17 (4): p.369-389Reference.
Language: English
Subjects: Thesaurus terms: Awareness Cognitive Processes Phenomenology Theories
Added Keywords: phenomenology & intrinsic theory of type 4 consciousness
Classification Code: Attention (2346)
Population Terms: Human
Abstract: According to an intrinsic theory of consciousness-sub-4, a mental-occurrence instance (MOI) is conscious-sub-4 (i.e., an immediate object of occurrent awareness) on its own, as a part of its own internal structure. The author discusses A. Gurwitsch's (1985) phenomenological argument in favor of an intrinsic theory of consciousness-sub-4 and his conception of how such inner awareness occurs in the case of objectivating mental acts, which are all conscious-sub-4 in Gurwitsch's view. Every objectivating mental act is a MOI that includes outer awareness (of something external to the act). Every objectivating act presents an object distinct from itself, conveys awareness of that object, and conveys awareness of itself (as a by-product or concomitant). The author examines what property of outer awareness necessarily brings along with it inner awareness of the objectivating act, and argues for the interweaving of inner and outer awareness in any conscious-sub-4 objectivating act. Rather than being marginal or concomitant, inner awareness is the thematizing activity of any conscious-sub-4 mental act. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved)