| Abstract: |
Discusses J. J. Gibson's (e.g., 1966, 1979, 1982) theory and the distinction
between perceiving and its component stream of perceptual experience. T. J.
Lombardo's objections to viewing perceptual awareness as a product and as a
main process are considered. Lombardo argues that perceptual awareness is
not a brain process; it occurs, rather, at the ecological level of organization. In
effect, this contradicts Gibson's theory, which holds (1) that information
pick-up, but not extraction, occurs at the interface between perceiving and
environment, and (2) perceptual experience (awareness), in contrast to
perceiving, is not publicly observable, as it would be by definition if it occurred
at the ecological level of organization. Additional examples of how the author
has used the distinction between the activity of perceiving and the perceptual
experience are presented. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |