| Abstract: |
Distinguishes 3 kinds of accounts of direct (reflective) awareness (i.e.,
awareness of one's mental occurrences causally unmediated by any other
mental occurrence): mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory, and
appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each
proposes that direct (reflective) awareness occurs in a fundamentally different
way. Also addressed is the crucial problem that appendage theory must solve,
namely, how does a direct (reflective) awareness succeed in being awareness
specifically of the particular mental occurrence instance that is its object? It is
argued that psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of
consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their
explanation of direct (reflective) awareness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all
rights reserved) |