54.

FORM: ARTICLE
Author: Natsoulas, Thomas
Affiliation: U California, Davis, USA
Title: What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness?
Source: Philosophical Psychology, 1993. 6 (2): p.137-154
Language: English
Subjects: Thesaurus terms: Cognition Consciousness States Theories
Added Keywords: mental eye of self intimidational vs appendage theories of consciousness of mental occurrences
Classification Code: Consciousness States (2380)
Population Terms: Human
Abstract: Distinguishes 3 kinds of accounts of direct (reflective) awareness (i.e., awareness of one's mental occurrences causally unmediated by any other mental occurrence): mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory, and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct (reflective) awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also addressed is the crucial problem that appendage theory must solve, namely, how does a direct (reflective) awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental occurrence instance that is its object? It is argued that psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their explanation of direct (reflective) awareness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved)