Author: Natsoulas, Thomas
Affiliation: U California, Davis, USA
Title: Are all instances of phenomenal experience conscious in the sense of their being objects of inner (second-order) consciousness?
Source: American Journal of Psychology, 1992 Win, 1992. 105 (4): p.605-612
Language: English
Publication Type: Comment
Subjects: Thesaurus terms: Cognitive Psychology Conscious (Personality Factor) Phenomenology Professional Criticism Reply
Added Keywords: consciousness or phenomenal experience as essence of cognitive psychological studies, commentary reply
Classification Code: Cognitive Processes (2340)
Population Terms: Human
Abstract: Replies to the critiques by B. J. Baars (see record 1993-20250-001) and R. A. Carlson (see record 1993-20255-001) concerning the author's original article (see record 1993-08172-001) on consciousness. The author addresses issues of phenomenal experience and inner (second-order) consciousness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved)