Author: Natsoulas, Thomas
Affiliation: U California, Davis, USA
Title: Ontological subjectivity.
Source: Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1991 Spr, 1991. 12 (2): p.175-200
Language: English
Subjects: Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Objectivity Theories Freud (Sigmund)
Added Keywords: J. Searle's & Freud's theories of ontological subjectivity & consciousness & intentionality in mental brain occurrences
Classification Code: History & Systems (2140)
Population Terms: Human
Abstract: Addressed here are certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity that J. R. Searle (e.g., 1983, 1989) has been calling attention to while arguing that certain brain-occurrences possess irreducibly subjective features in the sense that no amount of strictly objective, 3rd-person information about the animal and his/her brain and behavior could result in a description of any such features, except by inference based on 1st-person perspective. Searle has focused on the aspectual shapes of conscious mental brain-occurrences. However, Searle's view would seem, undesirably, to conceive of aspectual shape as purely appearential. This appears to be an abandonment of ontological subjectivity. Throughout the present article, Freud's conception of consciousness serves as an aid to understanding Searle's views of subjectivity, consciousness, and intentionality. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved)