| Abstract: |
Discusses B. F. Skinner's (see PA, Vol 72:29643, 29644, 29645, 29646,
29647, and 29936) replies to evaluations, criticisms, clarifications, and
extensions of his general radical behaviorist psychological theory and
philosophy. Topics discussed include (1) the existence of mental events; (2)
advice for psychologists; (3) thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, memories, and
feelings; (4) inner reference as stimulus control; (5) choosing a suitable
introspective utterance; (6) indeterminacy of meaning; (7) the external relation
of responding; (8) nonequivalence of feelings and private stimulation; (9)
Skinner's self-observations of pain; (10) a hypothesis of dual introspective
awareness; (11) primary introspective awareness; and (12) Skinner's reaction
to sensation classification. It is concluded that if operant behavioral control by
events, states, or processes in the brain is a fact, then Skinner will have to find
a way by which such behaviors in the brain produce other than proprioceptive
forms of private stimulation. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |